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INTRODUCTION
The nurse turned up the volume on a radio and the doctor spoke
softly, but Carolyn Jones could still hear his words.1 At an ultrasound
only hours earlier, Carolyn learned that her “much-wanted” second
child possessed a molecular flaw that meant he may not reach full
term and, if he did, would suffer from the moment of his birth.2 Out

1. The author of this Note received the express consent of Carolyn Jones to use her story. Carolyn
Jones, ‘We Have No Choice’: One Woman’s Ordeal with Texas’ New Sonogram Law, TEX. OBSERVER,
Mar. 15 2012, available at http://www.texasobserver.org/we-have-no-choice-one-womans-ordeal-withtexas-new-sonogram-law/.
2. Id.
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of compassion, Carolyn and her husband decided to abort the
pregnancy. 3 Upon arrival at Planned Parenthood, they learned that
Texas law required Carolyn to receive an ultrasound from the doctor
who would perform her abortion, listen to the doctor describe the
dimensions, heartbeat, limbs, and internal organs of the child she
would never have, and then wait at least twenty-four hours before
returning for the procedure.4 Despite apologies from the doctor and
nurses, and their attempts to drown out the words, Carolyn
remembers sobbing while hearing the doctor say, “I see four healthy
chambers of the heart.”5 Only later did Carolyn learn that her child’s
condition qualified her for exemption from hearing this description—
a closely regulated and rarely given exception.6
The procedure described above, and others like it, are based in the
doctrine of informed consent. 7 Informed consent serves as both a
medical ethics obligation and an important concept in tort law. 8
Although jurisdictions employ different standards for determining the
proper scope of informed consent, 9 every state imposes statutory
3. Id.
4. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4)(A)–(D) (West, WestlawNext through 2013
Third Called Legis. Sess.). This statute provides, in relevant part, that a woman cannot give voluntary
and informed consent to an abortion unless at least twenty-four hours before the procedure:
[T]he physician who is to perform the abortion . . . performs a sonogram on the pregnant
woman . . . displays the sonogram images . . . in a manner that the pregnant woman may
view them . . . [and] provides . . . a verbal explanation of the results of the sonogram
images, including a medical description of the dimensions of the embryo or fetus, the
presence of cardiac activity, and the presence of external members and internal
organs . . . [.]
Id.
5. Jones, supra note 1.
6. HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.0122(d)(3) (WestlawNext) (providing exception where the “fetus has
an irreversible medical condition or abnormality”). This exemption only applies to “the verbal
explanation” requirement; the ultrasound and twenty-four hour wait requirements still apply. Id.; Jones,
supra note 1 (explaining the Department of Health did not issue technical guidelines until four days after
her visit, a full three weeks after the procedures went into effect, accounting for the provider’s lack of
knowledge on her exemption).
7. HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.012. See generally Rebecca Dressler, From Double Standard to
Double Bind: Informed Choice in Abortion Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599 (2008) (discussing the
development of abortion informed consent law).
8. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 14–15 (Minn. 1905) (holding operation by a physician unlawful
when performed without the express or implied consent of the patient); Informed Consent, AM. MED.
ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/legal-topics/patient-physicianrelationship-topics/informed-consent.page (last visited Sept. 11, 2013).
9. Douglas Andrew Grimm, Informed Consent for All! No Exceptions, 37 N.M. L. REV. 39, 41
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requirements that health care professionals obtain patients’ informed
consent before proceeding with any type of medical treatment. 10
Most states also impose additional informed consent requirements in
the abortion context.11
On January 22, 1973, the Supreme Court released two influential
opinions concerning abortion—Roe v. Wade12 and Doe v. Bolton.13 In
Roe v. Wade, the Court held that, before a fetus reaches the point of
viability, a pregnant woman possesses the right to obtain an abortion
without interference from the state. 14 This holding derives from a
right to privacy embodied in the Constitution that “is broad enough to
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.” 15 However, in arriving at its decision, the Court also
emphasized that a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy is not
absolute because the state retains legitimate interests in both the
health and safety of the woman undergoing the procedure and in
protecting potential life.16 In Doe v. Bolton—intended to serve as a
companion to Roe v. Wade—the Court upheld the provision of a
Georgia abortion statute allowing a physician to exercise his best
medical judgment in “light of all factors . . . relevant to the wellbeing of the patient” in deciding to perform an abortion.17 However,
the Court found all procedural limitations in the statute
unconstitutional. 18 These two cases, along with subsequent others,
(2007). For example, the majority of jurisdictions use a physician-centered standard, focusing on what a
reasonable physician would disclose. Id. Other jurisdictions use a patient-centered standard, focusing on
what a reasonable patient would want to know. Id.
10. Informed Consent, supra note 8.
11. See Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST.: ST. POLICIES BRIEF,
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf (last updated Dec. 1, 2013); see also
discussion infra Part I.B.
12. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
14. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64 (emphasizing both the woman’s right to choose and the importance of
the medical judgment of her physician in making this decision).
15. Id. at 153; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (establishing a penumbra
of privacy that emanates from the Bill of Rights).
16. Roe, 410 U.S. at 148–50, 155 (noting that “at some point the state interests as to protection of
health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant”). Because of the dominant state interests
after the point of viability, this Note primarily focuses on pre-viability abortion.
17. Doe, 410 U.S. at 191–92.
18. Id. at 192–200 (invalidating requirements for hospitalization, approval by hospital abortion
committee, two-physician confirmation, and in-state residency reasoning that these requirements
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form the theoretical basis for evaluating heightened informed consent
requirements imposed on women obtaining abortions.19
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the
Supreme Court upheld additional informed consent requirements for
abortion as long as the information provided is “truthful and not
misleading” and does not impose an undue burden on the right to
obtain an abortion. 20 Recently, a few states enacted legislation
requiring a woman to obtain an ultrasound while a physician
simultaneously describes various attributes of the fetus as a condition
precedent to receiving an abortion. 21 These statutory “speech-anddisplay requirements” 22 include certain exceptions that vary by
state.23 For example, Texas provides narrow categories that qualify
for exemption,24 while Oklahoma and North Carolina exempt only
one specific situation—medical emergency.25
violated various constitutional rights).
19. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 66–67 (1976). In upholding a
written informed consent requirement for abortion, the Court in Danforth stated:
It is true that Doe and Roe clearly establish the State may not restrict the decision of the
patient and her physician regarding abortion during the first stage of
pregnancy . . . . [T]he imposition . . . of such a requirement for termination of pregnancy
even during the first stage, in our view, is not in itself an unconstitutional requirement.
Id. See generally Evelyn Atkinson, Abnormal Persons or Embedded Individuals?: Tracing the
Development of Informed Consent Regulations for Abortion, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 617 (2011)
(examining the historical development of informed consent laws).
20. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882–83 (1992); see discussion infra Part
II.A.
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85(a)(1)–(6) (West, WestlawNext through S.L. 2013-235 of 2013
Legis. Sess.); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4)(A)–(D) (West, WestlawNext
through 2013 Third Called Legis. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(B)(1)–(6) (West,
WestlawNext through 2013 First Reg. Sess.). A Louisiana Session Law, passed on June 7, 2012,
established the same requirements as the above listed statutes. Act of June 7, 2012, No. 685, 2012 La.
Sess. Law Serv. 2873 (West) (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.35.2(D)(2)(a)–(b) (West,
WestlawNext through 2012 Reg. Sess.)). However, this Note will focus only on the states where these
laws have already been in effect for enough time to spawn litigation—Oklahoma, Texas, and North
Carolina. See generally Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D.N.C. 2011); Tex. Med. Providers
Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated in part, 667 F.3d
570 (5th Cir. 2012); Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, No. 2:12-CV-00395, 2012 WL 1034022 (Okla. Cnty.
Dist. Ct. Mar. 28, 2012).
22. Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
23. See § 90-21.85(a) (WestlawNext); HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.0122(d)(1)–(3) (WestlawNext); tit.
63 § 1-738.3d(D) (WestlawNext); see also discussion infra Part I.C.2.
24. HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.0122(d)(1)–(3) (WestlawNext); see discussion infra Part I.C.2.
25. § 90-21.85(a) (WestlawNext); tit. 63 § 1-738.3d(D) (WestlawNext). These statutes also define
medical emergency narrowly to include only imminent physical emergencies. See discussion infra Part
I.C.2.
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This Note examines the speech-and-display requirements for
abortion and asks whether the exceptions, or lack thereof, to these
requirements invalidate their use as informed consent. Part I
discusses traditional informed consent doctrine, the additional
requirements imposed in the abortion context, and the exceptions to
these requirements.26 Part II considers the validity of these laws as
informed consent requirements in light of their exceptions by
applying the undue burden standard set out in Casey27 and comparing
these requirements and their exceptions with traditional informed
consent doctrine.28 Finally, Part III proposes changes that recognize
the state’s interest in protecting potential life while taking into
consideration the ability of a woman to make an autonomous
decision.29
I. INFORMED CONSENT, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ABORTION,
AND EXCEPTIONS
A. The Traditional Doctrine of Informed Consent
The tort doctrine of informed consent developed over the course of
the twentieth century. 30 Though originally based in common law,
every state has now codified informed consent doctrine. 31 The
American Medical Association defines informed consent as “a
process of communication between a patient and physician that
results in the patient’s authorization or agreement to undergo a
specific medical intervention.”32 The fundamental value underlying
26. See discussion infra Part I.
27. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see discussion infra Part II.A.
28. See discussion infra Part II.B.
29. See discussion infra Part III.
30. See Grimm, supra note 9, at 43; Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased
Counseling Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 4–5 (2012). For
example, a physician’s failure to obtain informed consent originally created a cause of action for battery.
See Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905). This changed, however, and actions for failure to
obtain informed consent now lie in negligence, specifically, medical malpractice. E.g., Natanson v.
Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1095, 1103 (Kan. 1960).
31. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.13 (West, WestlawNext through S.L. 2013-235 of 2013
Legis. Sess.) (codifying informed consent for healthcare treatments and procedures); Vandewalker,
supra note 30, at 2.
32. Informed Consent, supra note 8.
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informed consent doctrine is personal autonomy.33 Giving individuals
complete discretion in their medical decisions, with all information
necessary to make a knowledgeable choice, effectuates this value.34
In order to obtain valid informed consent, a physician must
disclose the “material risks” 35 of the treatment or procedure and any
alternatives, ensure that the patient understands this information, and
receive voluntary consent.36 A physician should also give the patient
an opportunity to ask questions about the treatment or procedure.37
This interaction forms the basis of another important value of
informed consent—the physician-patient relationship.38 While these
traditional requirements appear fairly simple, the informed consent
laws relating to abortion differ substantially and greatly complicate
this process.39

33. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). Justice Cardozo stated:
“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body[.]” Id.; accord Atkinson, supra note 19, at 635 (finding “a respect for the patient’s selfdetermination” a basis of early informed consent law); Grimm, supra note 9, at 39 (indicating this
statement by Cardozo “forms the backbone” of modern informed consent).
34. See Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1104. The court stated that every sound person can “expressly
prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, or other medical treatment. A doctor might well believe
that an operation or form of treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not permit him to
substitute his own judgment for that of the patient.” Id.; Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (finding that “[t]rue consent to what happens to one’s self is the informed exercise of a
choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and risks
attendant upon each”); Grimm, supra note 9, at 40–41.
35. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787 (quoting Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed
Consent to Therapy, 64 NW. U. L. REV. 628, 640 (1970)). The commonly used standard for determining
the materiality of a risk is “that ‘[a] risk is . . . material when a reasonable person, in what the physician
knows or should know to be the patient’s position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or
cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed therapy.’” Id. (alteration in original).
36. Grimm, supra note 9, at 40–41.
37. Informed Consent, supra note 8.
38. See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 (“The average patient has little or no understanding of the
medical arts, and ordinarily has only his physician to whom he can look for enlightenment with which to
reach an intelligent decision.”); see generally Atkinson, supra note 19.
39. See Vandewalker, supra note 30, at 4–13. Despite codification, many aspects of informed
consent remain based in common law, while almost all abortion informed consent requirements are
statutory. See id. at 4–6. However, the underlying principles of personal autonomy and the physicianpatient relationship remain the same whether evaluating common law or statutory requirements. See id.
at 5–6, 10, 53–54. Additionally, the common law on this topic closely aligns with statutory law as all
cases analyzing the cross-section of informed consent and abortion involve judicial interpretation of
statutes. See id. at 8–13.
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B. Additional Requirements for Informed Consent Applied to Those
Obtaining Abortions
The majority of states impose additional informed consent
requirements on abortion that single out this procedure for more
restrictive regulation. 40 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in
Casey to uphold an informed consent statute imposing heightened
requirements on abortion,41 a large number of states enacted statutes
modeled after the one in Casey.42 Some states’ regulations push the
boundaries of this policy even further.43
1. Heightened Informed Consent Requirements for Abortion
Many states require that physicians provide women seeking
abortions with certain types of information or discuss with them
specific abortion-related risks. 44 Courts routinely uphold
requirements that women sign written consent forms 45 and that
minors obtain parental consent prior to an abortion.46 Although courts
do not always favorably view these attempts at persuasion,47 a wide
range of heightened requirements survive judicial scrutiny.
40. Id. at 2; Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 11.
41. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (West, WestlawNext through Reg. Sess. Act 2013-72);
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992) (upholding statute that requires a
physician to inform a woman, “at least 24 hours before performing an abortion,” of the nature and health
risks of the procedure, the “‘probable gestational age of the unborn child,’” and the availability of
printed information about prenatal care, fetal development, child support, and adoption services).
42. See, e.g., Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Siegelman, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1199–1200 (M.D.
Ala. 2002) (“The Woman’s Right to Know Act is based largely upon the Casey statute.”); A Woman’s
Choice-E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434, 1439 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (“Public Law
187 is similar to a Pennsylvania law upheld by the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Southern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.”), aff’d, 980 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Ind. 1997), rev’d, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002).
43. See Dressler, supra note 7, at 1609–12.
44. Id. at 1609–10; Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed Consent,
Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 113 (2008).
45. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65–67 (1976).
46. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (upholding the constitutionality of these requirements
as long as there exists “an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be
obtained”); see generally Andrew R. Willis, Note, The Emergency Exception in Parental Involvement
Laws and the Necessity of Post-Emergency Notification, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 171 (2006) (examining
the development and application of parental consent laws).
47. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 972 (W.D. Tex.
2011), vacated in part, 667 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 2012). The district court in Lakey stated: “Casey thus
approved of some state regulations under which physicians are required to give pregnant women the
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Many cases uphold requirements mandating physicians provide
information about resources available should a woman decide not to
terminate her pregnancy, for example, addresses of adoption
agencies, resources for medical or financial assistance,48 or notice of
paternal support obligations. 49 States may also require medical
personnel to provide graphic material about the fetus, such as
informational videos 50 or enlarged, color enhanced photographs of
fetal development.51 In 2011, the Eighth Circuit upheld a requirement
that physicians tell abortion patients “the abortion will terminate the
life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being[.]” 52
Additionally, states may compel doctors to inform abortion patients
option of receiving certain kinds of information; it did not, however, give governments carte blanche to
force physicians to deliver, and force women to consider, whatever information the government deems
appropriate.” Id.; accord Perez v. Park Madison Prof’l Labs., Inc., 630 N.Y.S.2d 37, 39, 41–42 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1995) (rejecting argument that doctors should attempt to talk women out of abortions after
woman sued claiming she regretted her decision reasoning that such methods are unconstitutional and
doctors can rely on properly given informed consent).
48. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-23A-5(a)(1)-(2), (7) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess.);
Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Siegelman, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1197–98, 1206 (M.D. Ala. 2002)
(detailing and upholding Alabama’s Woman’s Right to Know Act); Dressler, supra note 7, at 1611
(finding the purpose of this information is to “make the choice of continued pregnancy more
appealing”).
49. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.2(B)(2)(b) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 First
Reg. Sess.) (“[T]he father is liable to assist in the support of her child, even in instances in which the
father has offered to pay for the abortion[.]”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(b)(3) (West, WestlawNext
through Chapter 143 of 2013 Reg. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76(D)(5) (West, WestlawNext through
2013 First Sp. Sess.); W. VA. CODE § 16-2I-2(b)(2) (West, WestlawNext though 2013 First
Extraordinary Session); ALA. CODE § 26-23A-5(a)(5) (WestlawNext). A small subset of states with this
requirement provide for an exception when the pregnancy is a result of rape. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-6709(b)(3) (“[I]n the case of rape this information may be omitted . . . [.]”).
50. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305.5(2) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 First Sp. Sess.).
In Utah, the informational video must state a preference for childbirth over abortion; describe the
abortion procedure and provide descriptions of “anatomical and physiological characteristics” of the
fetus at two-week increments “from fertilization to full term,” including brain function and
“development of external members and internal organs”; and “show an ultrasound of the heartbeat” at
each gestational increment. Id. § (2), (8); Dressler, supra note 7, at 1610–11.
51. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6710(a)(2) (West, WestlawNext through Chapter 143 of 2013
Reg. Sess.); Eubanks v. Schmidt, 126 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (finding enlarged and color
enhanced photographs of fetal development reasonable because they do not depict misleading or
untruthful information).
52. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 665, 667–68 (8th Cir.) (upholding this
disclosure requirement in Minnesota, South Dakota, and North Dakota), vacated in part on reh’g, 662
F.3d 1072 (8th Cir 2011), rev’d, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012). The South Dakota statute also contains
provisions requiring the physician to tell a woman that she “has an existing relationship with that unborn
human being and . . . by having an abortion, her existing relationship . . . will be terminated.” S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(c)-(d) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
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that the unborn child may survive outside of the womb53 and that the
fetus possesses the ability to feel pain.54
Many states’ laws also require that physicians disclose abortionrelated risks that go beyond the physical procedure, even though
most of these risks are scientifically unproven or have been proven
incorrect. 55 One example is requiring physicians to inform women
that abortion creates a risk of future infertility,56 although studies find
no relationship between voluntary abortion and infertility. 57
Similarly, some states mandate that physicians tell women abortion
increases their risk of breast cancer 58 despite the National Cancer
Institute explicitly rejecting this contention.59 As for mental health,
physicians may be required to tell women they could experience
psychological harm such as depression,60 suicide,61 or regret.62 While
53. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4(b)(3)(a) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess.);
Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1203.
54. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 31-9A-4(a)(3) (2012). Materials provided to women before an abortion
must include the following statement: “‘By 20 weeks’ gestation, the unborn child has the physical
structures necessary to experience pain. There is evidence that by 20 weeks’ gestation unborn children
seek to evade certain stimuli in a manner which in an infant or an adult would be interpreted to be a
response to pain.’” Id.; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1105(a)(1)(A) (West, WestlawNext through
2013 Reg. Sess.); MO. REV. STAT § 188.027(1)(5) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 First Reg. Sess.).
But see Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 794 F. Supp. 2d 892,
920–21 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (enjoining fetal pain provision after finding information “may be false,
misleading, and irrelevant”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 699 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133
S. Ct. 2738 (2013); Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of the
Evidence, 294 JAMA 947, 952 (2005) (finding that tests of cortical function show that a fetus possesses
no conscious perception of pain until at least the third trimester); Tobin, supra note 44, at 152
(concluding fetal pain statements “are questionably accurate and clearly misleading”).
55. See Vandewalker, supra note 30, at 13–19.
56. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 16-2I-2(a)(1) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 First Extraordinary
Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(iv) (WestlawNext).
57. Hani K. Atrash & Carol J. Rowland Hogue, The Effect of Pregnancy Termination on Future
Reproduction, 4 BAILLIERE’S CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 391, 402 (1990) (finding no
evidence of an association between induced abortion and later infertility except in cases where infection
occurs); Vandewalker, supra note 30, at 14.
58. See Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, State Abortion Counseling Policies and the
Fundamental Principles of Informed Consent, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 6, 9 (2007), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/10/4/gpr100406.html; Dressler, supra note 7, at 1609.
59. Abortion, Miscarriage, and Breast Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/
cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/abortion-miscarriage (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
60. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17015(11)(b)(iii) (West, WestlawNext through P.A.
2013, No. 108 of 2013 Reg. Sess.) (requiring provider to “[s]tate that as the result of an abortion, some
women may experience depression, feelings of guilt, sleep disturbance, loss of interest in work or sex, or
anger”); Vandewalker, supra note 30, at 15–16.
61. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 894, 906 (8th Cir. 2012) (allowing
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there exists anecdotal evidence of such reactions,63 the overwhelming
majority of scientific evidence disagrees.64 In fact, a task force for the
American Psychological Association found the most common
emotion experienced by women after an abortion is relief. 65
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit recently found such statements “are
part of the state’s reasonable regulation of medical practice.”66
2. The Speech-and-Display Requirements
Abortion providers regularly choose to perform ultrasounds on
their patients.67 Multiple states even require ultrasounds prior to an
abortion. 68 The informed consent statutes enacted in Oklahoma,
Texas, and North Carolina extend this requirement. 69 While these
enforcement of South Dakota abortion informed consent provision that listed “[i]ncreased risk of suicide
ideation and suicide” as a known risk of abortion).
62. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007). In upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban,
Justice Kennedy stated: “While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once
created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.” Id. (citation omitted).
63. See, e.g., A Woman’s Choice-E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434, 1449–50
(S.D. Ind. 1995) (discussing testimony of two women who regretted their abortions and now counsel
others who “experience feelings of guilt, depression, and low self-esteem”), aff’d, 980 F. Supp. 962
(S.D. Ind. 1997), rev’d, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002).
64. See, e.g., Anne C. Gilchrist et al., Termination of Pregnancy and Psychiatric Morbidity, 167
BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 243, 243, 248 (1995) (finding no difference in the rate of psychiatric disorders
between women who obtained abortions and those who did not in a study of 13,261 women
experiencing unplanned pregnancy); Trine Munk-Olsen et al., Induced First-Trimester Abortion and
Risk of Mental Disorder, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 332, 335 (2011) (finding no increase in women seeking
psychiatric services after abortion, but observing a slight increase after childbirth).
65. BRENDA MAJOR ET AL., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON
MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION 81 (2008), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/
abortion/mental-health.pdf (“Women also reported feeling more relief than positive or negative
emotions both immediately and 2 years after their abortion.”).
66. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012).
67. Katharine O’Connell et al., First-Trimester Surgical Abortion Practices: A Survey of National
Abortion Federation Members, 79 CONTRACEPTION 385, 388 (2009). The primary purposes for
performing an ultrasound before an abortion are to confirm a non-ectopic pregnancy, gestational age,
and number of fetuses. Id. However, ultrasounds are not medically necessary before all abortions. Id.
68. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(3)(a)(1)(b) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 First Reg.
Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76(B) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 First Sp. Sess.); ALA. CODE
§ 26-23A-4(b)(4) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
69. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(B)(1)-(4) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 First Reg.
Sess.). The Oklahoma statute provides:
In order for the woman to make an informed decision . . . the physician, shall: 1. Perform
an obstetric ultrasound on the pregnant woman, using either a vaginal transducer or an
abdominal transducer, whichever would display the embryo or fetus more clearly; 2.
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statutes are not identical,70 they all require the physician to display
the ultrasound and simultaneously describe certain fetal
characteristics.71
All three states faced lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of
these requirements.72 In all three cases, the courts granted injunctions
Provide a simultaneous explanation of what the ultrasound is depicting; 3. Display the
ultrasound images so that the pregnant woman may view them; 4. Provide a medical
description of the ultrasound images, which shall include the dimensions of the embryo
or fetus, the presence of cardiac activity, if present and viewable, and the presence of
external members and internal organs, if present and viewable[.]
Id.; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4)(A)–(D) (West, WestlawNext through 2013
Third Called Legis. Sess.). The Texas statute provides:
Consent to an abortion is voluntary and informed only if: . . . (A) the physician who is to
perform the abortion or an agent of the physician who is also a sonographer certified by a
national registry of medical sonographers performs a sonogram on the pregnant woman
on whom the abortion is to be performed; (B) the physician who is to perform the
abortion displays the sonogram images in a quality consistent with current medical
practice in a manner that the pregnant woman may view them; (C) the physician who is
to perform the abortion provides, in a manner understandable to a layperson, a verbal
explanation of the results of the sonogram images, including a medical description of the
dimensions of the embryo or fetus, the presence of cardiac activity, and the presence of
external members and internal organs; and (D) the physician who is to perform the
abortion or an agent of the physician who is also a sonographer certified by a national
registry of medical sonographers makes audible the heart auscultation for the pregnant
woman to hear, if present, in a quality consistent with current medical practice and
provides, in a manner understandable to a layperson, a simultaneous verbal explanation
of the heart auscultation[.]
Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN § 90-21.85(a)(1)–(4) (West, WestlawNext through S.L. 2013-235 of 2013
Legis. Sess.). The North Carolina statute provides:
[I]n order for the woman to make an informed decision . . . the physician, shall do each of
the following: (1) Perform an obstetric real-time view of the unborn child on the pregnant
woman[;] (2) Provide a simultaneous explanation of what the display is depicting, which
shall include the presence, location, and dimensions of the unborn child within the uterus
and the number of unborn children depicted. The individual performing the display shall
offer the pregnant woman the opportunity to hear the fetal heart tone. The image and
auscultation of fetal heart tone shall be of a quality consistent with the standard medical
practice in the community. If the image indicates that fetal demise has occurred, a woman
shall be informed of that fact[;] (3) Display the images so that the pregnant woman may
view them[;] (4) Provide a medical description of the images, which shall include the
dimensions of the embryo or fetus and the presence of external members and internal
organs, if present and viewable.
Id.
70. For example, Texas mandates the physician make the heartbeat audible to the woman. HEALTH
& SAFETY § 171.012(a)(4)(D) (WestlawNext). By contrast, Oklahoma and North Carolina require only
that the physician give the woman the opportunity to hear the heartbeat. § 90-21.85(a)(2)
(WestlawNext); tit. 63, § 1-738.2(B)(1)(a)(5) (WestlawNext).
71. § 90-21.85(a)(4) (WestlawNext); HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.012(a)(4)(C) (WestlawNext); tit. 63,
§ 1-738.3d(B)(4) (WestlawNext).
72. See generally Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D.N.C. 2011); Tex. Med. Providers
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preventing the enforcement of the speech-and-display procedure. 73
However, the Fifth Circuit later vacated the injunction in Texas,74
and the decisions in North Carolina and Oklahoma will almost
certainly be appealed. 75 These appeals will likely be grounded in
constitutional issues; however, informed consent doctrine both
factors into this constitutional analysis and serves as an additional
independent consideration.76
C. Exceptions From Informed Consent Requirements
Under certain circumstances, a physician may ignore or modify
informed consent requirements and proceed with little or no consent
from the patient.77 Different concepts and situations invoke different
exceptions, making the determination of whether an exception
applies primarily a case-by-case inquiry.78

Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated in part, 667 F.2d
570 (5th Cir. 2012); Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, No. 2:12-CV-00395, 2012 WL 1034022 (Okla. Cnty.
Dist. Ct. Mar. 28, 2012).
73. Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 429 (finding a potential First Amendment violation in that “[t]he
message is required even when the provider does not want to deliver the message and even when the
patients affirmatively do not wish to see it or hear it”); Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 975, 976–77 (finding
the statute violated the First Amendment right against government mandated speech and expression
because physicians must make the statements even if they do not “agree, regardless of any medical
necessity, and irrespective of whether the pregnant women wish to listen”); Nova Health Sys., 2012 WL
1034022, at *2 (finding the statute unconstitutional because it targets only abortion patients and
physicians performing abortions).
74. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs., 667 F.3d at 577–78 (finding these provisions
did not violate the First Amendment as “the required disclosures of a sonogram, the fetal heartbeat, and
their medical descriptions are the epitome of truthful, non-misleading information”).
75. Vandewalker, supra note 30, at 28 n.140, 31 n.155.
76. See Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 235 (2009). Finding that:
Informed consent law . . . provides a useful lens through which to critique abortion law’s
treatment of women as healthcare decision-makers. . . . The Supreme Court has at times
relied on the private law doctrine of informed consent as a guide in interpreting patients’
rights related to medical treatment under the Due Process Clause.
Id.; Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician
Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 972 (2007) (noting “informed consent doctrine raises First
Amendment questions that are quite distinct from the ordinary regulation of physician speech”).
77. Grimm, supra note 9, at 65.
78. See id. at 65–80.
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1. Exceptions From Traditional Informed Consent Laws
Four generally recognized exceptions exist to traditional informed
consent laws—presumed consent to diagnostic procedures,
emergency situations, therapeutic privilege, and waiver. 79 The first
exception, presumption of consent in diagnostic procedures, arises
from the concept that tests and observations do not implicate
informed consent in the same manner as actual treatment, such as
surgical procedures, because diagnostic procedures are minimally
invasive and serve only as a precursor to actual treatment. 80 The
second exception, emergency, accounts for situations where a patient
cannot provide consent to an immediately necessary medical
procedure, for example, if he or she is unconscious. 81 The
presumption underlying this exception is that failing to act will cause
greater harm than the proposed treatment.82
The third exception, therapeutic privilege, occurs when disclosure
of a risk poses such a significant threat to the psychological health of
the patient that the physician may choose to withhold the
information. 83 This exception allows physicians to maintain
conformity to both informed consent doctrine and the Hippocratic
Oath.84 However, courts caution physicians to construe this exception
79. Id. at 65.
80. Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617, 618 (Pa. 1997) (holding the doctrine of informed consent
applies only to surgical procedures); Grimm, supra note 9, at 65–66 (“[D]rawing blood, taking a
temperature, or conducting routine physical exams . . . are minimally invasive . . . . Requiring the
patient’s informed consent is unnecessary in the diagnostic stage because treatment has not yet begun.”).
But see Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 906–07 (Cal. 1980) (en banc) (finding physician failed to
meet his informed consent burden when he did not inform patient refusing pap smear of the risks,
reasoning patient did not understand the consequences of refusing this diagnostic procedure).
81. Sekerez v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 954 N.E.2d 383, 396 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). Four essential
elements are required for application of the emergency exception:
(1) [T]he existence of a medical emergency; (2) treatment was required to protect the
patient’s health; (3) it was impossible or impractical to obtain consent from either the
patient or someone authorized to consent for the patient; and (4) there was no reason to
believe that the patient would decline the treatment, given the opportunity to consent.
Id.
82. Stewart-Graves v. Vaughn, 170 P.3d 1151, 1156 (Wash. 2007) (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464
F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
83. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789.
84. Grimm, supra note 9, at 76 (noting that providing information to a patient that causes harm
violates the Hippocratic Oath, requiring physicians to do no harm to their patients, and the therapeutic
privilege exception alleviates this conflict).
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narrowly to ensure they do not circumvent the disclosure rule. 85
Finally, the fourth exception, waiver, allows a patient to make “a
voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.” 86 The
basis for this exception is the patient’s right to autonomy in decisionmaking. 87 While these traditional exceptions generally derive from
common law, the exceptions to the speech-and-display requirements
are provided for statutorily and modified by common law.88
2. Exceptions From the Speech-and-Display Requirements
Roe v. Wade established that states must include a regulatory
exception allowing abortions after the point of viability when
“necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.”89 However,
beyond this emergency provision, a state may decide on its own what
situations justify an exception. 90 Exceptions to speech-and-display
requirements vary by state.
Texas law provides for exemption from the fetal description in
three situations. 91 First, an exception is given if the pregnancy
resulted from sexual assault, incest, or another violation of the law, as
long as the incident was reported to police or remains unreported
because the woman fears reporting would put her at risk of injurious
retaliation. 92 Second, an exception exists for minors obtaining an
abortion pursuant to statutorily-defined judicial bypass procedures.93
Third, if the fetus has a documented “irreversible medical condition
or abnormality,” the woman is exempt from these requirements. 94
85. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789.
86. Grimm, supra note 9, at 77.
87. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
88. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
89. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973).
90. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
91. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0122(d)(1)–(3) (West, WestlawNext through 2013
Third Called Legis. Sess.).
92. Id. § 171.0122(d)(1).
93. Id. § 171.0122(d)(2); TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 33.003(i) (West, WestlawNext through 2013
Third Called Legis. Sess.). A judicial bypass allows a minor woman to obtain an abortion without
notifying her parents or guardian if the court finds she “is mature and sufficiently well informed, that
notification would not be in [her] best interest, or that notification may lead to physical, sexual, or
emotional abuse.” Id.
94. HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.0122(d)(3) (WestlawNext).
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These exceptions only apply to the verbal explanation; women
exempt under these exceptions must still receive an ultrasound and
wait twenty-four hours. 95 In a separate statute, Texas permits a
physician to perform an abortion absent any informed consent in
situations of medical emergency.96
By contrast, Oklahoma and North Carolina only allow for
exceptions in cases of medical emergency. 97 Both states define
medical emergency in this context as only physical conditions
requiring immediate abortion to prevent death or “substantial and
irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.” 98 Both
definitions explicitly state emotional or psychological conditions fail
to meet this standard.99 Finally, though not specifically classified as
exceptions, all three states provide, in slightly different ways, that
women may choose not to see or hear the ultrasound and
explanation. 100 These exceptions, or lack thereof, demonstrate the

95. See id. §§ 171.012(a)(4)(A)–(D), 171.0122(d)(1)–(3).
96. Id. § 171.0124.
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85(a) (West, WestlawNext through S.L. 2013-235 of 2013 Legis.
Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(D) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 First Reg. Sess.).
98. tit. 63, § 1-738.1A(5) (WestlawNext). Oklahoma provides that:
“Medical emergency” means the existence of any physical condition, not including any
emotional, psychological, or mental condition, which a reasonably prudent physician,
with knowledge of the case and treatment possibilities with respect to the medical
conditions involved, would determine necessitates the immediate abortion of the
pregnancy of the female to avert her death or to avert substantial and irreversible
impairment of a major bodily function arising from continued pregnancy[.]
Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.81(5) (West, WestlawNext through S.L. 2013-235 of 2013 Legis.
Sess.). North Carolina provides that:
A condition which, in reasonable medical judgment, so complicates the medical
condition of the pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abortion of her
pregnancy to avert her death or for which a delay will create serious risk of substantial
and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function, not including any
psychological or emotional conditions.
Id.
99. § 90-21.81(5) (WestlawNext); tit. 63, § 1-738.1A(5) (WestlawNext).
100. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(C) (WestlawNext). “Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a
pregnant woman from averting her eyes from the ultrasound images required to be provided to and
reviewed with her.” Id.; HEATH & SAFETY § 171.0122(b)–(c) (WestlawNext). “A pregnant woman may
choose not to view the sonogram images . . . . A pregnant woman may choose not to hear the heart
auscultation required to be provided . . . .” Id.; § 90-21.85(b) (WestlawNext). “Nothing in this section
shall be construed to prevent a pregnant woman from averting her eyes from the displayed images or
from refusing to hear the simultaneous explanation and medical description.” Id.
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true purpose and potentially violating nature of the speech-anddisplay requirements.101
II. APPLICATION OF CASEY AND COMPARISON TO TRADITIONAL
INFORMED CONSENT
A. The Casey Undue Burden Standard and its Application to the
Speech-and-Display Requirements and Their Exceptions
The Supreme Court’s decision in Casey establishes a standard for
evaluating heightened informed consent requirements for abortion.102
In Casey, the Court sought to recognize states’ legitimate interests103
while “ensur[ing] that the woman’s right to choose not become so
subordinate to the State’s interest in promoting fetal life that her
choice exists in theory but not in fact.”104 To balance these competing
objectives, the Court held that states may impose regulations on previability abortions, as long as the regulations do not impose an undue
burden.105 The Court articulated that a regulation imposes an undue
burden if it “has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.”106 Based on
this language, subsequent courts developed a two-prong test for
determining whether a statutory requirement places an undue burden
on a woman’s right to have an abortion.107 Because the Casey Court
101. See discussion infra Part II.
102. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992); Linda J. Wharton et al.,
Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
317, 323 (2006) (stating that Casey provides “the controlling standard for evaluating all abortion
restrictions”).
103. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973). In Roe, the Court found that, after the point of viability,
the State has legitimate interests in protecting both the health of the pregnant woman and the potential
human life. Id.; accord Casey, 505 U.S. at 872. In Casey, the Court agreed with the interests articulated
in Roe, but concluded that these interests exist throughout the entire pregnancy, not just after the point
of viability. Id.
104. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
105. Id. at 878.
106. Id. at 877 (emphasis added).
107. See A Woman’s Choice-E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 704 (7th Cir. 2002)
(Coffey, J., concurring) (finding Indiana abortion informed consent statute valid because the statute both
served the purpose of allowing women to make well-informed decisions and posed a substantial obstacle
for only ten to thirteen percent of women obtaining abortions); Wharton et al., supra note 102, at 354–
85 (detailing the implementation of the effects and purpose prongs in the common law since the Casey
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only ambiguously articulated what constitutes an undue burden, 108
lower courts possess a great amount of discretion in their analysis of
abortion related regulations.109 The Court did, however, establish that
these types of cases require a fact-intensive inquiry.110
1. Application of the Effects Prong of the Undue Burden Standard
The “effects” prong, also known as the “large fraction” test, is
based on the Court’s reasoning that, if “in a large fraction of the cases
in which [the provision] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial
obstacle to a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion,” 111 the
reviewing courts should view the provision as an “undue burden, and
therefore invalid.” 112 The Court did not indicate the exact percentage
required for a regulation to constitute an undue burden.113 However,
decision).
108. See Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 354 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting the “Casey Court provided
little, if any, instruction regarding the type of inquiry lower courts should undertake”); Sarah E. Weber,
An Attempt to Legislate Morality: Forced Ultrasounds as the Newest Tactic in Anti-Abortion
Legislation, 45 TULSA L. REV. 359, 362 (2009) (stating the Court “did not explain how to use the
standard—other than the ‘substantial obstacle’ language—leaving many uncertainties for lower courts to
decide”).
109. See Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 16–17 (Tenn. 2000)
(finding the undue burden approach offers “no real guidance” and “allows judges to impose their own
subjective views”).
110. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878–79; Wharton et al., supra note 102, at 359. “[Casey’s] fact-intensive
analysis protects women’s access to abortion by ensuring that regulations not deemed burdensome based
on the limited record before the Court in Casey may still be invalidated if they prove burdensome in
states with . . . other unique social, economic, and geographic circumstances.” Wharton et al., supra note
102, at 359.
111. Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
112. Id. at 893–95 (finding spousal notification requirement constituted an undue burden because a
significant number of women in domestically abusive marriages could not obtain abortions).
113. Id. at 895 (stating only “a large fraction”). Because the Court did not provide an exact number,
lower courts can decide whether a given percentage constitutes an undue burden. See, e.g., Tucson
Women’s Ctr. v. Ariz. Med. Bd., 666 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1105 (D. Ariz. 2009) (finding eleven out of
ninety-two women facing a substantial obstacle did not constitute a large enough fraction); A Woman’s
Choice-E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434, 1457 (S.D. Ind. 1995), aff’d, 980 F.
Supp. 962 (1997), rev’d, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding law imposed an undue burden when
abortions in the state were likely to drop as much as fourteen percent after implementation). In addition
to the lack of a uniform standard, problems of proof further complicate this analysis. See, e.g., Karlin v.
Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 487 (7th Cir. 1999); Eubanks v. Schmidt, 126 F. Supp. 2d 451, 457 (W.D. Ky.
2000) (finding a court must distinguish between indirect and direct effects). In Karlin, the court stated:
[T]o prove that an abortion regulation poses an undue burden on a woman under Casey, it
is not enough for a plaintiff to show that the number of abortions declined after the
passage of a state abortion regulation because that result is entirely consistent with a
state’s legitimate interest in persuading a woman to carry her child to term. The plaintiff
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the Court did make clear that the proper focus of this inquiry is the
women “for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom
the law is irrelevant.”114
The speech-and-display requirements may prevent some women
from obtaining abortions, but likely do not create an impermissible
effect. Just like in Casey, where the analysis focused on married
women who would refuse to notify their spouses, here, the focus of
the inquiry is the group of women who would refuse the ultrasound
and description, because the mandatory nature of these provisions do
not restrict the women who would accept the offer. 115 Though the
ultrasound requirement will create an additional financial burden,116
courts rarely find mere increases in cost sufficient to show an
impermissible effect. 117 Additionally, heightened informed consent
laws, in general, rarely lead to a decrease in abortions.118 Therefore,
the regulations themselves likely do not create an impermissible
effect.
must also explain why the law had this effect.
Karlin, 188 F.3d at 487; accord Casey, 505 U.S. at 925 (Blackmun, J., concurring). While difficult,
using “expert testimony, empirical studies, and common sense,” courts can determine if a regulation
violates the effects prong. Casey, 505 U.S. at 925 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
114. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894. In Casey, the State defended the spousal notification requirement by
stating that, after removing unmarried women and married women who voluntarily inform their spouses,
the provision affected only one percent of women obtaining abortions. Id. The Court disagreed with this
reasoning, finding “[t]he analysis does not end with the one percent of women upon whom the statute
operates; it begins there. Legislation is measured for consistency with the Constitution by its impact on
those whose conduct it affects.” Id.
115. See News Release, Okla. House of Representatives, House Votes to Override Pro-Life Vetoes
(Apr. 26, 2010) (available on WestlawNext) (noting that “ultrasounds are already routinely conducted
immediately prior to an abortion,” but this law expands this procedure by requiring physicians to
provide women with the pictures and information obtained from the ultrasound).
116. H. JOURNAL, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. S39–S40 (Tex. Mar. 3, 2011 Supp.), available at
ftp://ftp.legis.state.tx.us/journals/82R/pdf/House/82RDAY29SUPPLEMENT.PDF (acknowledging that
a woman would need to obtain the sonogram from her abortion provider, not a free entity, and that the
woman would bear this cost); Weber, supra note 108, at 371 (finding, in Oklahoma, requiring an
ultrasound would raise the cost of a first trimester abortion at a minimum approximately fifty percent).
117. See, e.g., A Woman’s Choice-E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 685, 693 (7th
Cir. 2002) (validating “in the presence” provision despite recognizing that the provision required women
to make two trips to the hospital, which raised the financial cost); Karlin, 188 F.3d at 481 (finding
“courts should not focus on whether the challenged regulation merely has the effect of making abortions
a little more difficult or expensive to obtain”).
118. See Tobin, supra note 44, at 124–25. “Anecdotal evidence from abortion providers suggests
mandated disclosures have little if any effect on women’s ultimate decisions. . . . even where mandated
disclosures are plainly inaccurate and calculated to dissuade, it is far from clear that a significant
number of women will actually forego abortions as a result.” Id.

Published by Reading Room, 2013

19

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 4

540

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

However, the lack of exceptions to the speech-and-display
requirements could create an impermissible effect. When looking at
the relevant group, logic implies that a “large fraction” of those who
would refuse the ultrasound may decide to forgo the abortion in order
to avoid the speech-and-display requirements.119 The psychological
burden created by this procedure could lead women to forego an
abortion simply because they cannot submit to the requirements.120
This appears especially true in North Carolina and Oklahoma where
victims of rape and incest must submit to these procedures. 121
Because women may choose not to obtain an abortion to avoid
undergoing this procedure, the requirements may create an
impermissible effect.
2. Application of the Purpose Prong of the Undue Burden
Standard
The “purpose” prong derives from the Court’s reasoning that any
regulations imposed “must be calculated to inform the woman’s free
choice, not hinder it.” 122 Therefore, if a regulation “serve[s] no
purpose other than to make abortions more difficult,” the regulation
will constitute an undue burden. 123 Originally, courts analyzing
abortion regulations struggled to define this prong and merely
described what did not constitute an improper purpose.124 However,
in Planned Parenthood Minnesota v. Rounds, the Eighth Circuit held
119. Jeffrey Roseberry, Comment, Undue Burden and the Law of Abortion in Arizona, 44 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 391, 400 (2012).
120. Id.
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85(a) (West, WestlawNext through S.L. 2013-235 of 2013 Legis.
Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(D) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 First Reg. Sess.).
122. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
123. Id. at 901; see also Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Atchison, 126 F.3d 1042, 1049
(8th Cir. 1997) (holding law imposed an undue burden when it imposed more restrictions on clinics
providing abortions than clinics that did not perform abortions).
124. See, e.g., Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 973, 976 (1997) (validating physician-only
requirement by rejecting claim that medical data showing non-physicians could perform abortions and
evidence that anti-abortion groups lobbied for the statute sufficiently proved the legislature acted with
impermissible motive); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 493 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting purpose challenges
rarely succeed “absent some sort of explicit indication from the state that it was acting in furtherance of
an improper purpose”); Wharton et al., supra note 102, at 378 (finding lower courts defined the
improper purpose test negatively).
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that provisions requiring disclosure of inaccurate information serve
an improper purpose.125 Some courts now evaluate whether the true
purpose of regulation is improper using a totality of the
circumstances test based on such evidence as “the language of the
challenged act, its legislative history, the social and historical context
of the legislation, or other legislation concerning the same subject
matter as the challenged measure.”126
a. Application of the Purpose Prong to the Requirements
The purpose underlying the speech-and-display requirements is
improper.127 In two out of the three states with these requirements,128
drafters of the legislation explicitly stated purposes bordering on
improper. In a phone interview, Senator Lamb, drafter of the
Oklahoma statute, explained that the purpose of the requirement was
to reduce the number of abortions. 129 During a legislative debate,
Representative Miller, drafter of the Texas statute, agreed that the
motive behind the regulation was “to get women to not have
abortions.” 130 While Casey allows regulations intended to preserve
potential life, 131 the Court also emphasized the importance of a
woman’s right to choose.132 This emphasis implies that the Court did
125. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 673 (8th Cir.), vacated in part on reh’g,
662 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012). The Eighth Circuit invalidated a
suicide advisory provision that required physicians to describe “‘all known medical risks’” to abortion
patients, including “‘[i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.’” Id. at 670 (alteration in original).
The court held this statement served as a “‘substantial obstacle’” because it contradicted leading
scientific evidence in the field and might mislead abortion patients instead of informing their decision.
Id. at 671, 673. Though later overturned on factual grounds, this decision demonstrates that statements
not meeting the “truthful and not misleading” requirement of Casey constitute an undue burden. Id. at
673.
126. Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 354 (5th Cir. 1999).
127. See Wharton et al., supra note 102, at 377–85. It is important to note that the difference between
legitimate state interests and improper purpose is a fine line and more of a judicial judgment call than an
easily recognizable distinction. Id.
128. North Carolina does not publish legislative history or house news.
129. Weber, supra note 108, at 365 (quoting from an interview with Senator Lamb).
130. H. JOURNAL, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. S2 (Tex. Mar. 3, 2011 Supp.), available at
ftp://ftp.legis.state.tx.us/journals/82R/pdf/House/82RDAY29SUPPLEMENT.PDF.
131. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
132. Id. at 849 (“It is settled now . . . that the Constitution places limits on a State’s right to interfere
with a person’s most basic decisions about family and parenthood, as well as bodily integrity.” (citations
omitted)).
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not intend for informed consent to serve as a talismanic phrase,
providing the state carte blanche to infuse its beliefs into the medical
decisions of its citizens. Thus, the regulation must also serve another
purpose in addition to this persuasion.133
Aside from attempting to convince women to forego abortions, no
other purpose exists for the speech-and-display requirements. First
trimester abortions present extremely minimal risk, therefore, these
requirements cannot be based on medical necessity.134 The speechand-display procedure, while emotionally charged, likely conveys
truthful and not misleading statements; 135 however, none of the
information provided relates to the abortion procedure itself and,
thus, does not serve the purpose of informed consent. 136 When a
regulation possesses neither a medical nor an informed consent
purpose, “the only purpose . . . is to discourage women from having
abortions.”137 Therefore, the regulations likely possess an improper
purpose.
b. Application of the Purpose Prong to the Exceptions
Unless a patient meets one of the few exceptions provided to these
requirements, 138 the physician must comply with the procedure or
face a large fine, mandatory disciplinary action, potential criminal
penalties, or denial of licensure.139 In Oklahoma and North Carolina,
133. Id. at 874 (noting that a law must serve “a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right
itself”).
134. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (acknowledging “the now-established medical
fact . . . that until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal
childbirth”); Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST.: ST. POLICIES BRIEF
(Oct. 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.pdf (finding less than 0.5% of
abortion patients experience major complications that require hospital care).
135. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577–78 (5th Cir.
2012).
136. Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 429 n.4 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (finding one purpose of the
requirements is persuading “women not to have abortions by presenting ‘compelling’ visual and
personal information”).
137. Weber, supra note 108, at 370.
138. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
139. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.018 (West, WestlawNext through 2013
Third Called Legis. Sess.) (imposing a fine up to $10,000); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion
Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 948 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated in part, 667 F.2d 570 (5th Cir.
2012) (stating, if a physician violates the statute, the medical board is required to refuse a renewal of the
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the only situation where a physician does not have to perform an
ultrasound and describe the fetus is a medical emergency.140 Texas
allows for three categories of exceptions to the speech requirement,
but only removes the ultrasound requirement in the emergency
context.141
The exceptions to the speech-and-display requirements illustrate
the improper purpose of the regulations. For example, the fact that
Texas provides an exemption for fetuses with fatal anomalies 142
demonstrates the state’s desire to prevent only women with viable
fetuses from obtaining abortions. Oklahoma and North Carolina’s
insistence that only a physical emergency can excuse a woman from
these requirements ignores the fact that “general usage and modern
understanding of the word ‘health’ . . . includes psychological as well
as physical well-being.”143 These narrow exceptions demonstrate that
states value fetal survival over the health of the mother, which
constitutes an improper purpose.144 Because the speech-and-display
requirements, particularly their notable lack of exceptions, potentially
create both an improper effect and improper purpose, these laws
likely impose an undue burden.
B. Comparison of the Speech-and-Display Requirements and Their
Exceptions and Traditional Informed Consent Doctrine
Although the state may impose heightened informed consent
requirements in the abortion context, 145 these requirements cannot
violate the very principles underlying traditional informed consent
doctrine.146 The “decision of whether to bear a child goes far beyond”

physician’s medical license and the physician faces potential fines or criminal penalties).
140. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
141. Id.
142. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0122(d)(3) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Third
Called Legis. Sess.).
143. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971).
144. Wharton et al., supra note 102, at 377–86.
145. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
146. See generally Grimm, supra note 9.
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the typical medical decision; however, this does not give states the
right to usurp the autonomy of the individual.147
1. Comparison of Informed Consent Doctrine to the
Requirements
The speech-and-display requirements do more than simply inform
women of the risks and alternatives of the medical procedure. 148
These requirements force physicians to “physically speak and show
the state’s non-medical message to patients unwilling to hear or
see.”149 For no other procedure must physicians provide such graphic
detail on what happens to the body. 150 The state emphasizes that
abortion differs from other procedures in its inherent irreversibility;
however, many surgical procedures—the removal of a kidney or even
plastic surgery—are also irreversible, but require far less
disclosure. 151 The unique nature of the speech-and-display
requirements implicates even more issues.
The required ultrasound may violate traditional informed consent
doctrine. Physicians must perform either a vaginal or abdominal
ultrasound on the patient, “whichever depicts the fetus more clearly”
to allow for a description.152 During the first trimester—when eighty147. Vandewalker, supra note 30, at 10.
148. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 975 (W.D. Tex.
2011), vacated in part, 667 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 2012).
149. Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432 (M.D.N.C. 2011).
150. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007). Justice Kennedy noted:
In a decision so fraught with emotional consequence some doctors may prefer not to
disclose precise details of the means that will be used, confining themselves to the
required statement of risks the procedure entails. From one standpoint this ought not to be
surprising. Any number of patients facing imminent surgical procedures would prefer not
to hear all the details, lest the usual anxiety preceding invasive medical procedures
become the more intense.
Id.; Vandewalker, supra note 30, at 20 (noting that even heart surgery patients need not hear such a
detailed description and, if they did, it would only serve to increase their anxiety). Of course, if a patient
did desire such a description prior to any type of procedure, he or she could simply ask the doctor for
this information. Vandewalker, supra note 30, at 20.
151. Response in Opposition to Defendants’ and Defendant-Intervenor’s Joint Motion for Summary
Judgment on Claims 1 Through 6 and in Support of Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on
Claims 3 and 6 at 9 n.5, Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, No. 2:12-CV-00395, 2012 WL 1034022 (Okla.
Cnty. Dist. Ct. Mar. 28, 2012), 2011 WL 6442261, n.5 (finding that “[t]here are myriad medical
procedures that have irreversible effects”).
152. Weber, supra note 108, at 379 (describing the ultrasound process).
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eight percent of abortions occur 153 —physicians most often use
vaginal ultrasounds. 154 In light of this, critics of the speech-anddisplay requirements nickname the procedure “state rape.” 155 This
requirement violates informed consent doctrine because it is
medically unnecessary and can potentially cause physical and
psychological harm.156 The ultrasound violates the very notion that
informed consent seeks to preserve—bodily integrity.157 Further, this
procedure “forces health care providers to use the body of each
abortion patient to create imagery in order to deliver the State’s
message about the embryo or fetus.”158
The physician’s description of fetal characteristics violates
informed consent because it provides no information relevant to the
impending procedure.159 An explanation of what the fetus looks like
does not convey medical risks or alternatives, only “emotional or
moral content.”160 The state argues that seeing the fetus and hearing it
described prevents a woman from later regretting her decision after
realizing she terminated the life of her child. 161 However, it is
illogical that a woman—who learned of her pregnancy, decided to
obtain an abortion, made an appointment, and followed through with
the procedure—would only realize months or years later that, but for
the abortion, she would have given birth to a child.162 Rather, these
153. Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, supra note 134.
154. Weber, supra note 108, at 379.
155. Lynn Arditi, Abortion Bill Requires Fetus Description, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., March 19, 2002,
available at 2012 WLNR 5846567. Critics also refer to the transducer used to perform the ultrasound as
a “shaming wand.” Id.
156. Weber, supra note 108, at 368–69, 380 (noting every abortion does not require an ultrasound,
performing a procedure the patient adamantly refuses strips away her bodily integrity, and the FDA
warns against medically unnecessary ultrasounds because of potential effects on human tissue).
157. Vandewalker, supra note 30, at 30 (stating vaginal penetration without consent violates this
notion).
158. Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction at 1, Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (No. 1:11CV804), 2011 WL
5062019.
159. Vandewalker, supra note 30, at 19–20.
160. Id. at 20–21.
161. H. JOURNAL, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. 632–33 (Tex. 2011), available at ftp://ftp.legis.state.tx.us/
journals/82R/pdf/House/82RDAY29FINAL.pdf.
162. Vandewalker, supra note 30, at 47–48; Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, supra
note 134. This is especially true given that sixty-one percent of women obtaining abortions already have
one or more children. Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, supra note 134.
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procedures serve to “morally Mirandize” women obtaining
abortions.163 This undermines personal autonomy because it plays on
women’s emotions as opposed to providing information to help them
make an educated decision.164 The fact that these requirements are
mandated, rather than optional, only serves to further violate the
traditional informed consent doctrine.
2. Comparison of Informed Consent Doctrine to the Exceptions
Exceptions exist to informed consent provisions to accommodate
the fact that each patient and each situation is different.165 When a
statute limits the available exceptions, this may lead to violations of
both important principles underlying informed consent doctrine—
personal autonomy and the physician-patient relationship.166
The first traditional exception, presumed consent to diagnostic
procedures, does not apply to abortion informed consent as an
abortion is a surgical procedure.167 The second exception to informed
consent doctrine, emergency, exists for these requirements in all
states, but only for physical issues. 168 By including only physical
emergencies and not psychological emergencies,169 these laws do not
allow physicians to properly tailor the requirements to each patient,
as informed consent doctrine advocates. 170 This also violates the
163. Weber, supra note 108, at 368; accord Vandewalker, supra note 30, at 30 (noting that “antiabortion activists apparently think that some women fail to understand that abortion is wrong but if that
message is conveyed to them, they will not terminate their pregnancies”).
164. Vandewalker, supra note 30, at 30; Weber, supra note 108, at 368.
165. Grimm, supra note 9, at 65.
166. See id. at 65–66; Vandewalker, supra note 30, at 39–40.
167. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992); see also Weber, supra
note 108, at 368. A strong argument exists for a requirement of informed consent to the ultrasound, as
this procedure is more than minimally invasive and not medically necessary. Weber, supra note 108, at
368, 380–81.
168. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
169. Grimm, supra note 9, at 70. Physical and psychological emergency differ temporally. Physical
emergency occurs before the administration of any informed consent information and allows the
physician to proceed without it. Id. Psychological emergency could occur after receiving the informed
consent information and would allow a physician to withhold certain information to avoid psychological
harm. See id. at 76. Because of this, psychological emergency can be considered synonymous with
therapeutic privilege. See id.
170. Vandewalker, supra note 30, at 48 (finding “health care professionals may be able to predict
when exposure to the results of an ultrasound will be distressing for the patient”).
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emergency exception’s underlying presumption that failing to act will
cause greater harm because, in situations where a woman foregoes an
abortion because she psychologically cannot submit to the speechand-display requirements, courts have recognized the subsequent
birth of a child may lead to even greater harm.171
The third exception to informed consent doctrine, therapeutic
privilege, is arguably the most important in the abortion context.172 In
Doe v. Bolton, the Supreme Court found that a physician should use
his medical judgment “in the light of all factors—physical,
emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to
the well-being of the patient.”173 By refusing to allow physicians to
decide not to provide patients with information they know will inflict
psychological damage, physicians are forced to violate the
Hippocratic Oath. 174 For example, in Texas, if a thirteen-year-old
rape victim too traumatized to report her attack decides soon after
learning of her pregnancy to obtain an abortion, a physician must
administer a vaginal ultrasound against her wishes and describe to the
girl the product of her rape. During legislative discussions, the author
of the Texas bill vehemently refused any amendments to the medical
emergency provision, stating he did not want to create any
“loopholes.”175 Thus, the physician no longer possesses the discretion
to decide what the patient should, and psychologically can, hear.176
171. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). The Court found:
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be
involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life
and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be
taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional
difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are
factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in
consultation.
Id.
172. See Grimm, supra note 9, at 65, 76.
173. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
174. See Grimm, supra note 9, at 76.
175. See H. JOURNAL, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. S19 (Tex. Mar. 3, 2011 Supp.), available at
ftp://ftp.legis.state.tx.us/journals/82R/pdf/House/82RDAY29SUPPLEMENT.PDF.
176. See Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 490 (7th Cir. 1999). This is especially true in cases where the
fetus possesses a lethal anomaly or the woman is suffering from an ectopic pregnancy. See id. at 489–
90. Multiple courts find it unconstitutional to provide certain informed consent provisions to women
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This destroys the physician-patient relationship underlying traditional
informed consent because the patient can no longer assume that the
physician has her best interests in mind.
Finally, the fourth exception to traditional informed consent,
waiver, does not exist for the speech-and-display requirements. The
failure of these statutes to provide a woman with the opportunity to
decide whether she wants to receive this information violates
personal autonomy—the fundamental value underlying all informed
consent.177 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the state may
not intimidate or bully a woman into having a child in the name of
informed consent.178 By refusing to allow a woman to decide that she
does not want to submit to the speech-and-display requirements, the
state effectively interferes with, or at least delays, her very right to
choose.
III. REMEDYING THE SPEECH-AND-DISPLAY REQUIREMENTS’
VIOLATIONS OF TRADITIONAL INFORMED CONSENT DOCTRINE
As previously noted, challenges to the speech-and-display
requirements are likely to be made on constitutional grounds, such as
First Amendment or Due Process violations. 179 However, the
conformity of the requirements and their exceptions to informed
consent doctrine is both a constitutional factor and an additional

who are obtaining abortions in these situations. Id. at 489 & n.16 (finding the provision of information
may cause severe psychological harm and furthers no legitimate purpose); see also Summit Med. Ctr. of
Ala., Inc. v. Siegelman, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1202 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (“As the court understands the
evidence, women with ectopic pregnancies and women carrying unborn children with lethal fetal
anomalies have no chance of successfully bringing a living child to term. Therefore, . . . requiring
physicians to provide these women with the information called for in the Act serves neither of the state
interests recognized in Casey.”).
177. See Grimm, supra note 9, at 77.
178. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 936 n.7 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he measures must be designed to ensure that a woman’s choice is
‘mature and informed,’ not intimidated, imposed, or impelled. To this end, when the State requires the
provision of certain information, the State may not alter the manner of presentation in order to inflict
‘psychological abuse,’ designed to shock or unnerve a woman seeking to exercise her liberty right.”
(citations omitted)); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759
(1986), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
179. See cases cited supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
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argument for courts to consider.180 To remedy the speech-and-display
requirements’ violations of informed consent doctrine, the laws must
include broader exceptions. If states provide increased exceptions,
however, the requirements themselves can likely remain.
A. Informed Consent Doctrine Serves as a Valid Justification for the
Requirements
Although the speech-and-display requirements could potentially
fail both the effects and purpose prongs of the Casey undue burden
standard,181 if given broader exceptions,182 informed consent would
likely provide a valid justification for these laws for three primary
reasons. First, the Supreme Court in Casey permitted states to enact
legislation designed to allow women to make a “mature and
informed” decision about whether to obtain an abortion.183 The Court
declared that states can require physicians to provide information,
even if it possesses no direct relation to the health of the woman or
“when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over
abortion[,]” as long as it furthers states’ legitimate interests. 184
Legislators enacting these requirements insist such procedures will
“‘empower . . . expectant mothers by giving them as much
information as possible’”185 and “make sure that the woman is fully
informed about the medical procedure that she is about to have.”186
180. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
181. See discussion supra Part II.A.1–2.
182. See discussion infra Part III.B.
183. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883.
184. See id. at 872, 877, 882–83. The Supreme Court in Casey found that it is valid for a state to
express its interest in preserving fetal life; however, this principle is not unlimited. Justice Kennedy
stated:
[T]he means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated
to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it . . . . What is at stake is the woman’s
right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so.
Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the
State . . . may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are
not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.
Id. at 877 (citations omitted).
185. News Release, Okla. House of Representatives, Lawmakers Vow to Continue Pro-Life Fight
(Apr. 23, 2010) (available on WestlawNext) (quoting Rep. Lisa Billy).
186. H. JOURNAL, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. 632 (Tex. 2011), available at ftp://ftp.legis.state.tx.us/
journals/82R/pdf/House/82RDAY29FINAL.pdf.
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Given these proffered justifications, a court may view such
procedures as validly informing a woman’s choice.
Second, courts traditionally demonstrate a great amount of
deference toward heightened abortion informed consent laws. 187
These requirements—with their physically invasive nature and the
deeply personal, as opposed to generally applicable, information they
provide—surpass the types of abortion informed consent statutes
upheld in the past.188 While the speech-and-display requirements may
possibly serve as the “breaking point” for heightened abortion
informed consent law, the current trend of judicial acceptance
remains.
Third, some women may want to receive an ultrasound and hear a
description of the fetus prior to receiving an abortion.189 Members of
the Texas and Oklahoma legislatures insist that women want to view
these images 190 and believe such images will greatly reduce the
amount of abortions. 191 Although studies and anecdotal evidence
demonstrate that ultrasounds do not alter a woman’s decision to
abort, 192 a valid argument can be made that some women would
choose to receive this information. The most important word in the
previous sentence is choose. Without broader exceptions, these
procedures violate both the woman’s right to make an autonomous
decision and the informed consent doctrine itself.
187. See Tobin, supra note 44, at 130–31 (“The principle of deference to legislatures is an old
one . . . courts must not invade the province and duty of legislatures to decide public policy.”).
188. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
189. Ellen R. Wiebe & Lisa Adams, Women’s Perceptions About Seeing the Ultrasound Picture
Before an Abortion, 14 EUR. J. CONTRACEPTION & REPROD. HEALTH CARE 97, 99 (2009). This study
found that seventy-two percent of women accepted an offer to view the ultrasound picture before an
abortion. Id.
190. H. JOURNAL 632 (stating that some women were even denied this opportunity).
191. News Release, Okla. Senate, Statement from Senate President Pro Tempore Glenn Coffee on
Reproductive Services’ Lawsuit (Apr. 27, 2010) (available on WestlawNext) (stating that anecdotal
evidence and history show that these requirements will reduce abortions).
192. See Wiebe & Adams, supra note 189, at 99 (finding that none of the women in the study decided
to not continue with the abortion after viewing the ultrasound); see also Kevin Sack, In Ultrasound,
Abortion Fight Has New Front, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/28/
health/policy/28ultrasound.html. An Alabama abortion provider stated that “‘about half’” of the women
offered pre-abortion ultrasounds chose to view them, but noted she “‘never had one patient get off the
table because she saw what her fetus looks like.’” Id. In fact, a woman interviewed for the article said
that, “‘[i]t was really the picture of the ultrasound that made me feel it was O.K.’” Id.
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B. The Speech-and-Display Requirements Must Include Greater
Exceptions to Validate Their Use as Informed Consent
The extremely limited nature of the existing exceptions to the
speech-and-display requirements violates the principles underlying
informed consent—personal autonomy and the physician-patient
relationship.193 Unless expanded, the lack of certain vital exceptions
invalidates the use of these requirements as informed consent for
abortion.
1. At a Minimum, the Medical Emergency Exception Must
Include Provisions for Psychological Health
While exceptions to these requirements for medical emergencies
exist in all states, 194 confinement to purely physical emergencies
violates not only the principles underlying informed consent, but also
the way modern society views health. Studies show increasing public
recognition of mental health and the inextricable link between
physical and mental health, even asserting that “[t]he bottom line is
that there is no health without mental health.” 195 In Casey, the
Supreme Court stated that “[i]t cannot be questioned that
psychological well-being is a facet of health.” 196 The lack of a
psychological medical emergency provision to the speech-anddisplay requirements does more than just ignore scientific evidence,
legal precedent, and the purposes behind informed consent—it fails
to recognize that the requirements themselves may cause
psychological harm.

193. See discussion supra Part I.A.
194. See discussion supra Part.I.C.2.
195. WORLD FED’N FOR MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH AND CHRONIC PHYSICAL ILLNESSES:
THE NEED FOR CONTINUED AND INTEGRATED CARE 4 (2010).
196. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
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a. Physicians Should Possess the Discretion to Withhold
Information for Psychological Reasons
While the Supreme Court never explicitly held that an express
mental health exception is required, 197 previous cases demonstrate
that courts do take psychological health into account in the abortion
context. In Casey, the Court found the informed consent statute did
not “prevent the physician from exercising his or her medical
judgment” because it included an exception for preserving physical
or psychological health. 198 In Karlin v. Foust, the Seventh Circuit
held that a physician may choose not to provide certain abortion
informed consent information, even absent express statutory
authorization, where doing so “would cause a woman psychological
harm sufficient to rise to the level of a medical emergency.”199 Many
subsequent court decisions also imply mental health justifications in
medical emergency statutes.200
The medical emergency exception to the speech-and-display
requirements disregards this precedent by expressly refusing to
recognize psychological conditions as worthy of exception.201 During
the Texas legislative debate, the senator who drafted the bill opposed
expanding the medical emergency exception, stating that he feared
doctors would abuse their discretion by not performing the
requirements in situations where a woman is “distraught” or the
doctor “think[s] she’s suicidal.”202 Refusing to allow a physician to
197. Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 489 (7th Cir. 1999).
198. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883–84. The statute allowed a physician to forego “the informed consent
provisions ‘if he or she can demonstrate . . . that he or she reasonably believed that furnishing the
information would have resulted in a severely adverse effect on the physical or mental health of the
patient.’” Id.
199. Karlin, 188 F.3d at 490. The medical emergency statute at issue defined emergencies as
conditions necessitating abortion to avert death or “serious risk of substantial and irreversible
impairment of one or more of the woman’s major bodily functions.” Id. at 459 (citation omitted). The
court found this provision broad enough to encompass threats to psychological well-being, reasoning
that “it would . . . seem illogical for a state to seek to protect a woman’s physical health while at the
same time casting aside all concerns regarding her mental health.” Id. at 490.
200. See, e.g., Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Siegelman, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1200–02 (M.D.
Ala. 2002); A Woman’s Choice-E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 671 N.E.2d 104, 111 (Ind. 1996).
201. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.81(5) (West, WestlawNext through S.L. 2013-235 of 2013 Legis.
Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.1A(5) (West, WestlawNext through 2013 First Reg. Sess.).
202. H. JOURNAL, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. S22 (Tex. Mar. 3, 2011 Supp.), available at
ftp://ftp.legis.state.tx.us/journals/82R/pdf/House/82RDAY29SUPPLEMENT.PDF.
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exercise discretion disregards the importance of medical judgment
articulated in Doe v. Bolton, Casey, and multiple other cases.203 This
also prevents the physician from making decisions based on the best
interest of the patient—a violation of the Hippocratic Oath, the
physician-patient relationship, and informed consent doctrine. Such
violations are especially egregious in situations where the patient is a
victim of rape or incest.
b. Special Exceptions Should Apply to Victims of Rape and
Incest
The laws should provide an unqualified exception for all those
who indicate that they are victims of rape or incest. Or, at the very
least, the laws should allow a physician to decide if the woman can
endure the procedure based on her psychological state. In discussions
on the intersection between rape and abortion, pro-life commentators
often focus on the difference between the rapist and fetus. For
example, former Pennsylvania Senator and presidential candidate
Rick Santorum recently stated: “The sad part [is] the United States
Supreme Court said that that person who commits that rape cannot be
executed . . . but that same Supreme Court says you can execute the
child who is the innocent victim of the rape.” 204 Notably, Senator
Santorum’s comments do not take into account the interests of the
third person in this equation—the woman—who is also an innocent
victim.205 While neither the Supreme Court nor any federal appellate
court require an exception for such situations,206 the nature of speechand-display requirements may constitute a situation where an
exception is needed.

203. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (noting both the importance of physician judgment and that the
physician-patient relationship deserves the same amount of respect in the abortion context as in all other
types of medicine).
204. Erin Burnett OutFront (CNN television broadcast Oct. 24, 2012) (interviewing Senator Rick
Santorum). Senator Santorum did state, however, that he opposes execution in both instances. Id.
205. See id.
206. See Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Siegelman, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1201–02 (M.D. Ala.
2002) (listing cases upholding statutes absent rape and incest exceptions).
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Oklahoma and North Carolina do not provide any exception for
victims of rape or incest.207 To obtain an abortion in these states, a
rape victim may be forced to submit to forcible penetration, an act
that literally defines rape itself. 208 The Governor of Oklahoma, in
vetoing the bill, which the legislature quickly overrode,209 stated that,
by not including an exception for victims of rape or incest, “the state
victimizes the victim for a second time.” 210 Forcing a victim to
receive an ultrasound and hear a detailed description of the product
of her rape could exacerbate the psychological damage inflicted by
the rape or even dissuade her from obtaining the desired abortion
because she is psychologically unable to endure this process. This
places the physician in a morally difficult position and deteriorates
the physician-patient relationship. Additionally, this violates the
value of personal autonomy and removes from the woman the very
same thing that the rape itself took away from her—control.
While the Texas statute includes an exception for victims of rape
or incest, this exception is too narrow to effectively protect sexual
assault victims from further trauma. 211 The exception requires that
the rape be reported to police; however, at least two-thirds of rape
victims do not report their attack.212 In Casey, the Court agreed with
the district court’s finding that “many of these women may be
psychologically unable to discuss or report the rape for several years
after the incident.” 213 The only exemption from the reporting
requirement is reasonable belief of retaliation resulting in serious
207. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
208. Bureau of Justice Statistics: Violent Crime, BUREAU OF JUSTICE, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=31 (last visited Sept. 23, 2013) (defining rape as forced “vaginal, anal[,] or oral
penetration by the offender” or a foreign object).
209. News Release, Okla. House of Representatives, House Votes to Override Pro-Life Vetoes (Apr.
26, 2010) (available on WestlawNext).
210. H. JOURNAL, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. 1454–55 (Okla. 2010), available at
http://www.okhouse.gov/Journals/HJ2010/2010%20Hleg%20Day49.pdf.
211. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
212. LYNN LANGTON ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
VICTIMIZATIONS NOT REPORTED TO THE POLICE, 2006–2010 4 (2012) (finding sixty-five percent of
known rape or sexual assault victimizations go unreported). These statistics come from the National
Crime Victimization Survey, so it is unknown how many women refused to report even on the survey.
Id. Additionally, this category encompasses all forms of sexual assault, meaning the number of actual
rape victims who do not report could be much higher. Id.
213. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 890 (1992).
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bodily injury;214 however, fear of reprisal accounts for only a small
portion of women who do not report their attack.215 Additionally, this
provision requires physicians to place their livelihood, wallet, and
freedom on the line by relying on the patient’s unconfirmed assertion
that she believes retaliation will occur.216 Thus, this exception does
not resolve the informed consent violations created by the speechand-display requirements because it benefits only a marginal number
of victims and strains the physician-patient relationship.
By adopting a narrow definition of medical emergency, the
legislature substitutes its judgment for that of experienced,
credentialed physicians. 217 Since psychological emergency is
essentially synonymous with therapeutic privilege,218 extending this
definition would simultaneously resolve the issues related to the
absence of a therapeutic privilege exception. However, returning the
exercise of discretion to physicians does not wholly resolve the
violations of informed consent doctrine because, in creating such
stringent requirements with so few exceptions, the legislature also
substitutes its judgment for that of the woman—a flagrant violation
of personal autonomy.

214. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
215. LANGTON ET AL., supra note 212, at 4. Only twenty-eight percent of those who do not report
their rape do so because of “fear of reprisal or getting [the] offender in trouble.” Id. (emphasis added).
Since lack of reporting for fear of getting the offender in trouble does not qualify for exception from the
requirements, the number of women that this provision benefits is probably even lower. Id.
216. Declaration of Curtis Boyd, M.D., in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
9, Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942 (W.D. Tex. 2011)
(No. 1:11-CV-00486-SS), vacated in part, 667 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 2012), 2011 WL 5902713 (“I do not
know what injuries would be ‘serious’ enough, whether the woman’s view that the injury would be
‘serious’ is all that matters, or how realistic the woman’s fear has to be . . . . I find it hard to believe that
I am protected as long as the woman checks the line on the form.”). Similarly, Dr. Boyd expressed
concern over simply “tak[ing] the patient’s word” that a fetal anomaly constitutes an “irreversible
medical condition or abnormality” within the meaning of the exception. Id.
217. Linda P. McKenzie, Federally Mandated Informed Consent: Has Government Gone Too Far?,
20 J.L. & HEALTH 267, 274 (2007) (“Physicians are . . . far better equipped to inform and advise their
patients.”).
218. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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2. The Speech-and-Display Requirements Should Include a
Provision for Waiver
To prevent the speech-and-display requirements from violating
personal autonomy, the requirements must also provide a woman
with the option to waive the procedure. Although mandatory
heightened abortion informed consent requirements exist, 219 the
intrusive nature of the ultrasound and the fact that the information
delivered is extracted from the woman’s own body create a
“profound . . . intrusion . . . far more extreme than, and qualitatively
different from, any abortion law enforced in this country.” 220 The
state should not require a violation of bodily integrity that can cause
physical and psychological harm.
Some legislators insist that statutory provisions prescribing that a
woman need not see or hear the information function as a waiver.221
It is true that a woman can avert her eyes from the screen to avoid
seeing the image. However, none of these legislators can explain how
a woman “lying on the table with her legs spread very far apart, in
stirrups, and . . . unclothed from the waist down” can avoid hearing
the words spoken by a person no more than an arm’s length from
her.222 During the Texas legislative debate, a senator pointed out the
only “humiliating” alternative would force the woman to say “‘la la
la la la,’ . . . what you used to do as a kid when you didn’t want to
hear your parents or something.” 223 Regardless of whether the
woman receives the information, she is still required to submit to the
procedure. Not requiring actual visual or auditory perception does not
prevent the physician from invading her body to extract non-medical,
emotionally charged information without her consent. Thus, this
“exception” does not remedy the violation to personal autonomy or
219. See discussion supra Part.I.B.1.
220. Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction at 1, Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (No. 11CV00804), 2011 WL
5062019.
221. See H. JOURNAL, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. S35–36 (Tex. Mar. 3, 2011 Supp.), available at
ftp://ftp.legis.state.tx.us/journals/82R/pdf/House/82RDAY29SUPPLEMENT.PDF; supra note 100.
222. H. JOURNAL, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. S11 (Tex. Mar. 3, 2011 Supp.), available at
ftp://ftp.legis.state.tx.us/journals/82R/pdf/House/82RDAY29SUPPLEMENT.PDF.
223. Id. at S14.
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destruction of the physician-patient relationship generated by these
requirements.
Finally, the state should consider that, while biologically
unavoidable, these heightened requirements apply only to women,224
meaning the regulations implicitly demonstrate the state’s view of a
woman’s ability to make autonomous healthcare decisions. 225 It is
offensive for legislators “to think that abortion patients have not
already carefully thought about the decision to terminate their
pregnancies before they visit an abortion provider.”226 Additionally, a
senator pointed out during the Texas legislative debate that the effect
of this legislation is to “treat Texas women worse than . . . inmates,”
because states cannot force inmates to undergo medical intervention,
but they can impose non-waivable and intrusive informed consent
requirements for abortion.227 Allowing a woman to choose whether
she wants to undergo the speech-and-display procedure prevents
these laws from violating the two primary principles underlying
informed consent law—personal autonomy and the physician-patient
relationship—and reinstates the choice in her right to choose.

224. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63
N.C. L. REV. 375, 382–83 (1985). Justice Ginsburg stated:
It is not a sufficient answer to charge it all to women’s anatomy . . . . Society, not
anatomy, “places a greater stigma on unmarried women who become pregnant than on
the men who father their children.” Society expects, but nature does not command, that
“women take the major responsibility . . . for child care” and that they will stay with their
children, bearing nurture and support burdens alone, when fathers deny paternity or
otherwise refuse to provide care or financial support for unwanted offspring.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
225. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[L]egal
challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion
of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy
equal citizenship stature.”); Dressler, supra note 7, at 1615 (finding “[a]bortion disclosure laws separate
women deciding about abortion from people deciding about other kinds of medical interventions”);
Vandewalker, supra note 31, at 13 (stating that heightened informed consent requirements for abortion
“show the Court’s willingness to accept the notion that women’s decision-making abilities are
deficient”).
226. Vandewalker, supra note 30, at 32; Sack, supra note 192 (noting an abortion patient took offense
to “the state’s implicit suggestion that she had not fully considered her choice”).
227. H. JOURNAL S14.
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CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Casey, states have
continually enacted heightened informed consent requirements that
they believe correspond to the legitimate interests states retain in the
abortion context. 228 These heightened requirements, however, must
conform to the doctrine they purport to be grounded in—informed
consent. 229 The new speech-and-display requirements enacted in
Oklahoma, Texas, and North Carolina establish a procedure more
invasive, personalized, and emotionally charged than previously
imposed in any state. 230 Despite the extreme nature of the
requirements, precedent in similar situations indicates these laws
could constitute valid informed consent as long as they include
expanded exceptions.231
Because every situation in life does not conform to statutory
ideals, exceptions to informed consent must exist. 232 Statutory
speech-and-display requirements provide few, if any, exceptions,
making them essentially mandatory preconditions to an abortion for
every girl, woman, and physician, in every situation. 233 This
complete disregard for a woman’s consent and elimination of the
physician’s medical discretion violates the primary principles
underlying informed consent doctrine—personal autonomy and the
physician-patient relationship—and informed consent doctrine
itself.234 In order to remedy these violations, the requirements must,
at the very least, allow physicians to tailor the information based on
the psychological capacity of the patient,235 but really should include
a provision allowing for a woman to waive receipt of this information
entirely. 236 Without such expansions, the speech-and-display
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

See discussion supra Part I.B., II.A.
See discussion supra Part I.A.
See discussion supra Part I.B.2, II.A.1, II.B.1.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Part I.C.1.
See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
See discussion supra Part II.A.2, II.B.2.
See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
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requirements do not serve as valid informed consent for a woman’s
medical choice; they only serve to physically, emotionally, and
morally punish a woman for exercising her right to choose.
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